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MORAL ICONS: A COMMENT ON STEVEN · 
LUBET'S RECONSTRUCTING 
ATTICUS FINCH 
William H. Simon* 
Atticus Finch's conduct would have been justified by the bar's 
conventional norms even if he had known Tom Robinson to be 
guilty. That fact, however, is not the source of the admiration for 
him that To Kill a Mockingbird has induced in so many readers. 
That admiration depends on the clear premise of the novel that 
Finch plausibly believes that Tom Robinson is innocent. Thus, the 
bar's invocation of Finch as a sympathetic illustration of its norms is 
misleading. The ethics of the novel are quite different from those of 
the bar. 
Steven Lubet does a good job of showing that the novel's ethics 
are somewhat out of step with contemporary liberal sentiment. In 
order to be confident of Robinson's innocence, we have to take for 
granted aspects of Harper Lee's portrayal of his accusers that today 
smack of gender and class bias. I differ somewhat with Lubet over 
the significance of this failing for ethical discussion in two respects. 
First, if we treat the novel as a professional responsibility hypo­
thetical, then I think Finch's conduct is ethically plausible - not 
just in terms of the bar's norms, but in terms of the more ambitious 
conceptions of justice that the novel and Lubet invoke - as long as 
he had any doubts about Robinson's guilt. Unless Finch knew for 
certain that Mayella Ewell was testifying truthfully, he would have 
viewed his cross-examination as an effort to test her credibility (or 
if he was certain she was lying, to expose her). Yes, he did trauma­
tize and humiliate her. This is a major injury, and in many situa­
tions it might be unconscionable to inflict it. But in 1930s Alabama, 
an accusation of rape by a white woman against a black man was 
tantamount to a demand for the man's death. Even a truthful rape 
victim should understand that the stakes in this situation warrant 
efforts that may be painful to her to assure the soundness of the 
verdict. 
Second, if we treat the novel as a depiction of an exemplary 
moral figure, my strongest objection is more general than the one 
Lubet raises. Lubet doesn't like it that Lee reduces her villains to 
"stereotypes." On the other hand, his principal disappointment is 
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that she fails to make Finch · in�o a fully consistent stereotype 
("icon") of virtue. Up until the ending of the novel, Lee clearly 
tries to do this, and her effort no longer succeeds for the reasons 
Lubet mentions. But there is a serious question as to whether icons 
of virtue are what we should look for in novels. Uncomplicated 
goodness is what romantic and escapist fiction offer us. More ambi­
tious novels give us more complex, less perfect role models. 
Romantic fiction can inspire us, but it can also make us smug and 
unreflective. Ambitious fiction is less intoxicating in its inspiration, 
but it urges us to confront a broader range of experience. 
There is one point in To Kill a Mockingbird where the novel 
starts to cross the boundary between romantic and ambitious fic­
tion. This is at the very end, which is curiously ignored by those 
who invoke the book on behalf of conventional professional norms. 
The ending is the only point at which Atticus is portrayed as less 
than perfect. He loses an argument with the sheriff, and he collabo­
rates on a project which today could only be called "obstruction of 
justice." He agrees with the sheriff to encourage the children to lie 
about Bob Ewell's death to make it appear an accident, when in 
fact, they think Finch's son has killed him. The killing was clear 
self-defense, but the sheriff's point is that the local system of justice 
has not proven itself so reliable that it can be trusted to vindicate 
him. Here is a portrayal of virtue that is intentionally complex (un­
like the trial, where the complexity Lubet explicates is uninten­
tional). Our role model was initially wrong (for resisting the 
sheriff's plan), even now is not certain he's doing the right thing, 
and is doing something that, though it seems likely to be the right 
thing, involves violation of the law. This tentative and compro­
mised kind of virtue seems more interesting, and the portrayal of it 
more valuable, than the iconic virtue Finch has heretofore shown 
because it seems the only kind possible in many of the most morally 
compelling situations lawyers face in life. 
